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Rejoinder
Malay Ghosh
It is a pleasure to receive comments from two
very distinguished statisticians who themselves have
made fundamental contributions to the development
of objective priors. Their comments clarify many of
the ideas presented in this paper, thereby providing
further insight to the selection of objective priors.
I will respond individually to their comments.
BERNARDO
I agree with Professor Bernardo that prior elici-
tation is nearly impossible in situations which call
for very complex models. What I meant to say is
that with years of accumulated data (e.g., for med-
ical practitioners), it is sometimes possible to elicit
a reasonable prior for certain parameters of frequent
interest (e.g., the cure probability of a particular
drug). In dose-response models, it is often possible
to find meaningful priors for the logistic regression
parameters.
I agree with Bernardo that objective Bayesian me-
thods are unquestionably more appealing than ad
hoc frequentist methods. A classic example is the
Behrens–Fisher problem. Also, he is correct in as-
serting that even frequentist concepts such as min-
imaxity, admissibility, etc. call for Bayesian tools,
and objective priors can become quite handy for
such situations. A point to note here, though, is that
since these concepts are not primarily Bayesian, of-
ten the choice leads to quite unappealing priors. For
example, for the binomial proportion, minimaxity
demands a (
√
n/2,
√
n/2) prior, where n is the sam-
ple size. I sincerely doubt that any practitioner will
ever be interested in using such a prior.
I owe an apology to Professor Bernardo for not
referring to Berger, Bernardo and Mendoza. I am
Malay Ghosh is Distinguished Professor, University of
Florida, 223 Griffin–Floyd Hall, Gainesville, Florida
32611-8545, USA e-mail: ghoshm@stat.ufl.edu.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2011, Vol. 26, No. 2, 210–211. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
also thankful to him for pointing out that in ref-
erence analysis, one does not let the sample size n
go to infinity, but lets k, the conceptual number of
replicates of the original experiment, go to infinity.
It was never my intention to advocate priors al-
ternate to Jeffreys in the one parameter case. My
sole objective was to point out that if one considers
a general class of divergence priors, Jeffreys’ prior
emerges as the solution in the interior of the param-
eter space, but not on the boundary. This is more
in the spirit of telling a complete story rather than
preaching something new. For instance, in the bi-
nomial case, I do not recommend necessarily using
the Beta(1/4,1/4) prior in preference to Jeffreys’
Beta(1/2,1/2) prior unless there are other good rea-
sons for using the former.
I like to point out that in the ratio of normal
means problem, the probability matching criterion
does not reproduce the conventional Fieller–Creasy
frequentist solution. This has been exploited in a very
general framework by Ghosh, Yin and Kim (2003).
Also, I like to add that while reference priors have
general universal appeal, often their choice is very
much dependent on the ordering of parameters. This
may be a daunting task, especially for very complex
models. Presumably, one can salvage such situations
by considering prediction rather than estimation.
SWEETING
I agree essentially with every single comment made
by Professor Sweeting and indeed thank him for
bringing out several important issues barely touched
upon in my article. I take this opportunity to under-
score a couple of the fundamental arguments that he
has put forward.
The first one is the contrast between estimation
and prediction. Bernardo’s proper scoring rule is
based on the negative of the logarithm of the prior
predictive pdf, geared primarily toward parametric
estimation. In contrast, the negative of the loga-
rithm of the posterior predictive pdf is ideally suited
for prediction. In many situations, it is difficult, if
not impossible to pinpoint the parameter of inter-
est. Predictive inference for unobserved but poten-
tially observable quantities does not face this prob-
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lem, and often is the most desired mode of infer-
ence. The currently popular neural nets and ma-
chine learning techniques aim solely toward predic-
tion. A more classical example is finite population
sampling where the goal is to find the predictive dis-
tribution of the unobserved given the observed.
The second important point is that often the prior
can overshadow the data. The simple (albeit ar-
tificial) example put forward by Professor Sweet-
ing amply demonstrates this. Implicit in this is the
fact that nonjudicious selection of priors by nonex-
perts can lead to meaningless inference far removed
from reality. While modern statistics in general, and
Bayesian statistics in particular, is trying to tackle
high-dimensional complex data problems, the exist-
ing methodology may not always be adequate to
provide the right solution. However objectionable
to a purist, it may genuinely be necessary to invent
data-dependent priors from a pragmatic standpoint.
I may add, though, that if we subscribe to this last
dictum, there is no particular reason to criticize any
particular mode of selection of objective priors as
long as it works.
FINAL REMARKS
I strongly believe that we will never be able reach
a consensus on the selection of a default prior which
will work well under all situations. Also, I do not
see any need for such an agreement. A very prudent
thing is to have a large number of the so-called “ob-
jective” priors in one’s toolkit, and see which one is
most appropriate in a particular instance. Also, it
is important to replenish the toolkit from time to
time. I agree with Sweeting that the term “subjec-
tive” is possibly better than “objective” in spite of
the latter’s current global usage. Finally, I thank the
discussants for their valuable comments, and hope
that the dialogue will continue in the future.
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